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Rethinking Nationalism

State Projects and Community Networks in 19th-Century Ottoman Empire

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This article challenges the idea that a centralized administrative infrastructure, a common citizenship, and the resulting national belonging run in the same direction in state transformations. Comparing two Ottoman provinces of Edirne and Ankara, the author argues that community networks influence local responses to administrative centralization and national identity formation. In the province of Edirne, dense communal networks that bridged religious and ethnic boundaries maintained local cooperation with state centralization, whereas dense relations within religious and ethnic communities contributed to the failure of the formation of Ottoman national identity. In the province of Ankara, the lack of dense relations connecting different communities prevented reform success in both administrative and ideological dimensions.

Keywords: social networks; nationalism; state transformation; Ottoman Empire

In the transformation from empire to nation-states, the notion that state centralization supports formation of national identity has been widely accepted in political and historical sociology (Hobsbawm, 1983; Smith, 1989; Tilly, 1994; Weber, 1976; Woloch, 1994). A centralized administrative infrastructure, a common citizenship to form direct links between rulers and ruled, and the resulting national belonging are three aspects of nation-states. Most theories of nationalism and state transformation have taken the Western European example and assume that these three run in the same direction and reinforce each other (Centeno, 2002; Hechter, 2000). Presenting comparative cases of Edirne (Adrianople) and Ankara (Angora)—a Balkan and an Anatolian province of late Ottoman Empire, respectively—the article argues that this connection among administrative centralization, citizenship, and national identity is frequent but not necessary. The three can contradict each other, especially when administrative centralization passes through particular ties (e.g., communal and/or patronage).

The Ottoman Empire presents an appropriate example to examine this relationship. The modernizing and Westernizing Tanzimat reforms (1839-1878) entailed

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changes in all three dimensions: A hierarchical and centralized bureaucratic administration was created, an Ottoman citizenship idea was formulated, and the state engaged in creating a common Ottoman nationhood through administrative and ideological mechanisms. Although administrative centralization was quite successful, the formation of Ottoman national identity was not completed with the uprisings of Balkan populations.

Based on in-depth analysis of archival documents from the province of Edirne and Ankara (roughly covering areas of Eastern Thrace and Southeastern Bulgaria), the article analyzes how existing local identities interact with state projects of national identity. To show the importance of local relations and community networks in influencing state centralization efforts and formation of national identity, it compares Edirne with the province of Ankara (located in Central Anatolia). Dense relations that bridged religious and ethnic boundaries combined with the special positioning of the local elites in community networks created a concern for public good, and the residents of Edirne cooperated with state centralization projects while the state attempt to foster Ottoman national identity failed.

**Theoretical Approach**

Formation of national identity has typically been viewed as a product of the state. Change in political structures—namely transformation from indirect to direct rule—triggers nationalism. Indirect rule—ruling through third parties without much interference to periphery—characterizes imperial regimes. Tribute-taking empires built a large military and extractive apparatus but left most administration to regional power holders retaining great autonomy. Another type of indirect rule existed in city leagues and federations. Here, temporary coalitions and consultative institutions played significant parts in war and extraction, but little in the way of a state apparatus emerged. Rulers often attained tight control over a single city and its hinterland. Beyond that, however, they had to bargain with the authorities of competing centers (Tilly, 1992).

Michael Hechter (2000) argues that indirect rule thwarts nationalism. Indirect rule reduces the demand for sovereignty among the members of culturally distinct groups and increases the cost of collective action across the board: “There is no motive for nationalism when the boundaries of the nation and the governance unit are congruent, for then the nation already has self-determination” (p. 26). Nationalism is most likely to emerge “following the breakdown of indirect rule due to the rise of direct rule, and due to the collapse of the centre in a multinational empire” (Hechter, 2000, p. 28). Multiethnic empires relied on local intermediaries in provincial administration. The rise of direct rule eliminated local intermediaries and formed direct relations between rulers and the ruled. Imposition of central authority led to the reaction of local units, and nationalism became a likely option with formation of nation-states.

Miguel Centeno (2002) describes the process of mutual reinforcement of state centralization, citizenship, and nationalism in the European model well. Adopting
Charles Tilly’s extractive–coercive axis for state formation, he argues for the exceptionality of the European model of state transformation. Total war, which required political and military mobilization, provided “both the incentives and the means with which the central power was able to dominate” (p. 103). In addition, warfare leads to reciprocal expansion of the following:

a) increased capacity to extract resources, b) centralization of power in national capitals and the gradual disappearance of regional loyalties or identities, c) stronger emotional links between the population and both a set of state institutions and often abstract notion of a nation that these are meant to represent, and d) a qualitative shift in the relationship of the individual to these institutions, which may be summarized as the transition from subject to citizen. (Centeno, 2002, p. 22)

Centralization, citizenship, and national identity run into the same direction in this Western model.

Centralization and implementation of direct rule encourages both state building and state-seeking nationalisms (Tilly, 1994). Especially during nation-state building, rulers attempt to form national identities using beliefs, myths, and stories. These efforts at cultural homogenization constitute state-building nationalism by which the central state is able to turn royal subjects into members of a nation-state. Quite frequently, the use of force and indoctrination are mentioned as important means of national identity production. Expanding education and justice and centralizing provincial administration help to implement state-imposed nationalism (Weber, 1976; Woloch, 1994).

The intervention of state reforms to the periphery helps implement direct rule and contributes to the mutual relationship between centralization and state-building nationalism. Philip Gorski (1999) considers state reforms as important projects not only to increase central control but also to mobilize human resources and regulate populations. Effective reforms need to use symbols and identities through which rulers can mobilize subjects and maintain their loyalty. Gorski calls this aspect of state-rule ideological infrastructure. He also defines administrative infrastructure as the existence of networks and organizations through which state administrators can penetrate into everyday life and regulate individual contact. The success of state reforms at the local level is dependent on state control over both ideological and administrative infrastructures (pp. 156-157).

In the alternative form, state-seeking or peripheral nationalism refers to popular demands of groups to form their own nation-states. In this type of nationalism, local groups or parts of local groups recognize themselves as a nation and make demands for a separate state. National identity comes first and may act against the existing rulers with separationist demands (Brubaker, 1996; Smith, 1989; Tilly, 1994). “The growth of direct rule provides local authorities with a strong interest in mobilizing populations dependent on them to protect their extensive rights and prerogatives. This interest often underlies peripheral nationalism” (Hechter, 2000, p. 28). Resistance
to assimilation was greatest in those communities where strong patron–client ties and organized community relations allowed local notables to mobilize a dependent peasantry. In the Ottoman Empire, the sequence of peripheral nationalism followed the timing of the imposition of direct rule; first in the Balkan provinces and last in the eastern ones. Wherever there was sufficient cultural homogeneity to foster territorial solidarity, peripheral nationalism often followed suit (Hechter, 2000, pp. 68-76). Peripheral or state-seeking nationalism rises as a response to state centralization, and it challenges both administrative centralization and national identity imposed by central rulers.

The majority of scholarly writings on the Tanzimat argues for the inability of reforms to increase state control in both administrative and ideological infrastructures. In this framework, state reforms, contributed to the rise of state-seeking nationalism in the Balkan provinces. The imperial center was not able to mobilize human resources to support changes in the administrative infrastructure because of financial crisis, international pressure, and low state capacity (i.e., the ability of the state to organize and redistribute goods, people, and resources). Equal rights were granted to eliminate millet distinctions and to create an Ottoman citizenship. Separate educational and judicial institutions for millets—confessional communities recognized by the Ottoman state and granted certain rights in religious practice, education, and justice—survived in centralizing state administration, and they empowered religious and ethnic communities and contributed to the decentralization of provincial administration (Davison, 1963; Zurcher, 1993). The reaction of peripheral groups to state-imposed nationalism refused both administrative centralization and Ottoman national identity.

In contrast to this argument of failure in both administrative and ideological dimensions, and contrary to the presumed Western European model, the finding of this study shows that the imperial center was quite successful in increasing its control over administrative infrastructure in the province of Edirne during the Tanzimat. Community networks, including relations among local actors, mobilized support for state reforms and facilitated the increase of state control over the administrative infrastructure. Local relations—specifically the existence of frequent contacts among millets crossing over religious and ethnic boundaries—facilitated state reforms, but dense relations within religious and ethnic communities prevented the formation of Ottoman national identity. In the comparative case of the province of Ankara, both administrative centralization and national identity formation slowly proceeded and rarely produced successful results when the lack of ties crossing over religious and ethnic boundaries prevented coalition building among local residents.

What Was the Ottoman Citizenship Project?

The Ottoman citizenship project aimed at both administrative centralization and formation of an Ottoman national identity. The Gulhane Edict (1839) premised
guarantees for life, honor and property, equal taxation, and equal military conscription for all Ottoman subjects, and the Reform Decree (1856) allowed the entrance of non-Muslims to civil service. In practice, however, these premises hardly came into reality (Davison, 1963, pp. 3-80). These reforms were a result of the demands of European powers that pressured the Ottoman government to reform its administration and to improve the conditions of non-Muslim subjects. In addition to European pressure, there was a genuine belief in the need for reform among the Ottoman bureaucrats. In an attempt to overcome the effects of war losses and financial crises, the Ottoman ruling elites communicated with European ruling elites, and their model for reform was Europe where nation-states increasingly became the dominant form.

In the administrative infrastructure, centralization aimed at the formation of a regular bureaucracy, regulation of taxation, formation of a central police and military force, and secularization and standardization of justice and education. State centralization was accompanied with the idea of Ottoman citizenship through which direct ties between rulers and the ruled are formed. In the ideological component, several writers and thinkers of the Tanzimat advocated the idea of Ottoman citizenship that would grant equal rights and responsibilities to all Ottoman subjects and therefore create a belonging to the Ottoman nation regardless of religious and ethnic differences. The most famous of them was Namık Kemal whose definition of Ottoman nation was based on the inclusion of all religions and ethnicities in the Ottoman citizenship although he advocated the compatibility of Islam with democracy and suggested a mixture of Islamic values and Western democracy (Rahme, 1999). Forming a national assembly that would bring representatives of religious and ethnic communities together while not challenging the status quo of rulers and thus forming a belonging to the Ottoman nation was part of Kemal’s agenda. The idea of a national assembly also aimed at preventing nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and other regions of the empire, and the first Ottoman Constitution (1878) and the Ottoman Parliament symbolized the Ottoman citizenship project.

In the Western European examples, the grant of equal rights combined with increasing state control over the provincial administration enhanced state-imposed national identities while decreasing the importance of local, religious, and ethnic identities. Yet the Ottoman experience was the opposite: The Ottoman state visibly centralized its administration in the provinces but failed to create an Ottoman national identity. Centralization and state-imposed national identity was reacted by state-seeking nationalisms of the Balkan populations.

Studies on the subject emphasize multiple factors for the failure of Ottoman national identity project. One factor that has been frequently stated is that it was too late to form an Ottoman nation when nationalist ideologies of the French Republic were already in effect in the Balkans. The existence of an independent Greek state and the Serbian Principality, European influence on Christian subjects, and especially Pan-Slavic policies of Russia made the implementation of the Ottoman citizenship difficult during the Tanzimat. Although this argument points to the importance of international
environment, it does not fully explain the failure of Ottoman national identity. Nationalist movements emerged in the Balkans at the beginning of the Tanzimat era, but they were able to generate mass support only toward the end of the 19th century. Nationalist ideas spread in the upper and educated groups but were not well received by the masses. They ascribed a nationalist character in the 1870s for Bulgaria and Bosnia and in the 1900s for Macedonia (Jelavich, 1983; Meininger, 1987).

Internal constrains of administration played as much importance as external threats and ideologies. The application of reforms challenged old administrative practices but did not completely destroy them. To avoid open conflict with political opposition, Ottoman reformers proceeded gradually and incorporated some old practices into the modernizing and centralizing state structures. One of those was the legacy of the millet system, which recognized rights of communities, unlike the notion of citizenship that is based on individual rights.

The reforms aimed to eliminate religious and ethnic differences and to form a belonging to the Ottoman nation, but at the end, they reinforced millet distinctions when the administration continued to recognize communities as units of administration. Rights continued to be granted to communities, not to individuals, and made the implementation of a common Ottoman nationhood quite difficult (Karpat, 1973). For example, representation in local councils was based on the millet distinctions, and religious and ethnic differences were not eliminated but were rather reproduced with the legal representation of millets in the local administration (Hourani, 1968; Çadırcı, 1997; Ortaylı, 2000).

Another reason for the failure of Ottoman national identity was the slow pace of reform in some crucial areas such as justice and education. The Ottoman state partially attempted but could not completely centralize education and justice during the Tanzimat. Sharia courts, millet courts, and mixed courts coexisted. A similar decentralized system continued in education. Millets established their separate community schools over which state control was minimal. There were attempts to merge education and justice to reinforce the Ottoman citizenship project, but they were not successful: Secular courts that provided justice for all Ottoman subjects were established but were not preferred by both Muslims and non-Muslims. In terms of higher education, several schools were founded to educate state bureaucrats open to all Ottoman subjects. However, attempts to merge primary education—the crucial stage for building national identity—were not successful.3

In this discussion about reforms, the impact of regional variance on reform outcome is largely neglected. In addition to domestic and international concerns at a broader level, the outcome of state reforms is dependent on community networks that produce reactions to the state-imposed projects of centralization and national identity. Different community networks set different patterns of interactions between the state and local actors, which may result in varying successes of state reforms in administrative and ideological dimensions. The comparative cases of Edirne and Ankara display how the application of the reforms were received and challenged by local structures.
Administrative Reforms, Ideological Infrastructure, and Community Networks

Ankara

The province of Ankara was located securely in Central Anatolia and included several important towns such as Ankara, Kangır, Kayseri, Yozgad, and Sivas. Because of limited water sources, dry weather, and infertile soil, agricultural products hardly maintained subsistence of the inhabitants (Önsoy, 1994; Özdemir, 1986). Ankara, which used to be an important trade center and a major textile manufacturing city in earlier centuries, declined significantly as a result of the import of cheap British textiles in the 18th and 19th centuries (Galanti, 1951; Ortaylı, 1994). The province was inhabited by a Muslim majority. Armenians, Greeks, and Jews lived in the province too, and their population was about 10% to 15% of the total population.4

Due to its geopolitical and economic insignificance, the Ottoman state followed an extractive policy. State agents were mainly involved in extracting tax revenue and did not attempt to transform local life in the province during the Tanzimat. There were a few development projects: Telegraph lines and railroads reached to province, and they aimed at providing fast revenue flow to the center toward the end of the 19th century. The state did not attempt to change local structure either. Some state agents were appointed to local administration from Istanbul. However, local notables continued to dominate administration. They were appointed to state offices and elected to local councils. The imperial center incorporated the local elite and continued to rely on their brokerage.

Social network analysis is used to define the structure of the Ankara local network. In this analysis, data from the archives—mainly local petitions and official reports—are used to define the Ankara network.5 These documents refer to several issues about provincial administration that the locals wanted to address to the center, including taxation disputes between tax collectors and local residents, complaints about irregularities and bribery in local administration, problems in the maintenance of public services, complaints about tribal populations, and reports about contentious gatherings. The network represents relationships not among individuals or concrete groups but among categories of individuals and groups.6 Individual and concrete group names are grouped according to occupation and geographical location. Because the data detect interactions among local actors when they notify state offices, they do not show what the actual network of relations was at the local level. Rather, the ways in which local actors are connected to the state and how they reflect ties among local actors to state authorities can be derived from the data.

The density analysis shows that the local network in Ankara was loosely connected during the Tanzimat era (mean density = 0.036). The same network analysis is also used for the Edirne network. Social network analysis gives the opportunity to compare density of local relations and the degree of state centralization in the provinces of Ankara and Edirne. Figures 1 and 2 compare global density and global degree centrality scores for Ankara and Edirne community networks, respectively.
To account for change over the 40-year period during the Tanzimat (1839-1878), separate network matrixes were generated for four 10-year periods using Pajek program for large network analysis. Global network density measures the connectedness of relations among the actors of the networks. Global degree centrality measures the extent to which the network resembles a set of spokes radiating from a single hub; in other words, it shows the extent of centralization in the network. The analyses were run by both including and excluding the state (i.e., the imperial center to which most communications were directed) from the networks to test the centrality of the state.

Global network density scores in Edirne were higher than Ankara for the first three time periods, showing denser relations among local actors in the province of Edirne than of Ankara. The degree centrality scores show that the Edirne network was more centralized than the Ankara network. This centralization was a result of increasing state control over the local network. This is indicated with the absence of a regular pattern for degree centrality scores for both networks when the state is excluded from the network analysis.

Global degree centrality scores display decline in centralization of the Ankara network over time. This should not be interpreted as a complete failure of the state in the province. Before the Tanzimat, the region was dominated by strong, notable families who were few in number but prominent in administration. The biggest
family was the Cabbarzades (also known as Çapanoğlu). During the Tanzimat, strong families were gradually integrated to state cadres, and the decline in degree centrality scores actually refers to decline in the centrality of the Cabbarzade family.9 Members of the family secured appointments in local councils. Some were appointed as Ottoman officials. In 1847, among nine local members of the newly founded council of the town of Kangırî, three had the title “Cabbarzade,” a title which indicates their membership in the prominent family.10 Other members of the family formed taxation companies, secured tax collection privileges of several villages, and subleased them to local people (Prime Ministry Archives, 1852). In addition to the Cabbarzades, there were middle-range local families who were powerful in small towns and villages.11 Their control was limited to a town or village and did not expand to other localities. Conflict as well as coalition building was limited among these smaller families because most controlled a well-defined region without the intervention of other notables.

Contacts among members of different millets were limited to daily economic transactions, and in the lack of connections crossing over religious and ethnic loyalties, the formation of Ottoman national identity was not a viable option in Ankara.
Cooperation on development projects was rare too: Construction of telegraph lines was a possible venue for cooperation and in some places, local contributions to telegraph lines were recorded. Yet other issues such as construction of state offices and repair of roads and bridges were expected from the state. The state demands for money and labor were discussed and rejected in local councils partly because of inability of the local elite to pay high amounts of money and partly because of their inability to cooperate (Prime Ministry Archives, 1869b, 1871).

The overall reform outcome in Ankara shows a gradual improvement. Taxation revenue slightly increased during the Tanzimat. The state was able to form the niche of local bureaucracy, first occupied by the local elite but later appointed from the imperial center. In terms of social and economic development projects, reforms did not accomplish much. A few municipal buildings were constructed in major cities such as Ankara and Kayseri. Even in the city of Ankara, investments in infrastructure did not produce successful results. Water network within the city was not repaired, repairs of roads and bridges were not completed, and education was completely left to private enterprise without opening good-quality state schools (Köksal, 2002a, pp. 118-120).

To sum up, economic underdevelopment, extractive state policy, low density of connections among local groups, and lack of cooperation among the local elite prevented the success of administrative and ideological component of reforms in Ankara. In Edirne, differences in these factors led to a different outcome.

**Edirne**

The province of Edirne was geopolitically significant, economically developed, and inhabited by a non-Muslim majority. It was located in Eastern Thrace, close to Greek independent state and Serbian Principality, and it included major urban centers such as Edirne, Plovdiv, and Sliven. Edirne served as the center for military expeditions in the Balkans and was the capital city of the empire before the conquest of Constantinople (İslahi & Koz, 1999). Edirne was located on important trade routes that connected Asia Minor with Central and Eastern Europe. In the 19th century, large landholdings began producing for the world market in the Balkan provinces (McGowan, 1981). They produced mainly commercial grains including wheat, cotton, and rice. Several towns and ports in the province became important trading centers (Zachariadou, 1996). The development of trade in the province encouraged manufacturing and new factories were opened in the region (Todorov, 1998). Economic development was supported by a cosmopolitan environment. Majority of the population was non-Muslim, mainly Greek and Bulgarian. Muslims were the second largest group followed by Jews and a small community of Armenians.12

The Ottoman state considered the province crucial for the reforms because of this geopolitical importance. Maintaining consent of non-Muslim populations in the Balkans was important for the success of the Ottoman citizenship project and for satisfying European demands. As a result, the Ottoman state adopted an integrationist
policy that aimed at incorporating the local level into the state and changing the local structure. Changes in the local structure began before the Tanzimat. Sultan Mahmud II, an early 19th-century reformer, eliminated strong notables in the Balkans, especially in Eastern Thrace, when he banned Janissaries and formed the new regular army (Peremeci, 1939). In contrast to Ankara where strong notable families controlled the administration, there were no strong families in Edirne during the Tanzimat. Rather, middle-range intermediaries whose power was based on economic activity (not on strong family connections) competed with each other for state favors.

The development of trade and commercial agriculture led to the development of two powerful local groups in Edirne: Muslim landholders and non-Muslim (mainly Greek, Bulgarian, and Jewish) merchants and traders which were the first niches of new bourgeoisie (Todorov, 1998). Landholders were mainly Muslims because they earned land as fief grants in earlier centuries or gained control of land through tax collection (Güran, 1998). The non-Muslim communities took advantage of their religious affiliation and familiarity with European languages to advance their trade connections with European merchants, and they became the middlemen of the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. Throughout the 19th century, non-Muslim traders gained power and challenged the traditional authority of the old elite (i.e., religious leaders and çorbacıs).

Economic development provided a dense network of relations in the province. The density of trading activity put members of different communities in frequent contact. The mean density score for the Edirne network was 0.07 for the 1839-1878 period. These frequent transactions in daily life led to the development of enduring ties among people from different origins. Trading partnerships among merchants, tax collectors, and landholders who belonged to different ethnic and religious groups were quite frequent. Competition for economic benefits forced the local elite to form coalitions that crossed over religious and ethnic boundaries.

At the same time, non-Muslim millets became better organized as the monetary support of the new bourgeoisie contributed to the construction of new schools and formation of literary and aid societies. The tighter organization in millets provided national awakening in these communities and led to occasional contention among the members of different millets although these clashes did not have a well-defined national claim in the early Tanzimat years. Although the Ottoman state attempted to impose the Ottoman citizenship project on different religious and ethnic groups, increasing politicization of religious and ethnic boundaries and national awakening are well documented in archival reports. The British ambassador in Edirne, H. Elliot, reported organized Bulgarian activity to form a separate Bulgarian church: “Three weeks ago, several delegates were sent here by eight Bulgarian villages of Adrianople to the authorities that they no longer recognize the religious and civil authority of the Greek Bishop; and they were determined not to allow him to exercise any authority over them” (National Archives, Foreign Office, 1869). The governor of the province and the ex–Grand Vizier who led an inspection commission in
Roumelia frequently complained about the difficulty of maintaining the trust and loyalty of non-Muslim subjects to the state administration and mentioned the necessity of just and open state rule in the region. While millets became better organized and asserted their separate religious and ethnic identities, cooperation in trade eased communication among the local elite and provided an opportunity for further cooperation on state-development projects. One measure of this interethnic cooperation is the comparison of collective petitions that include demands and complaints of local residents from the imperial center in the provinces of Edirne and Ankara. The comparison displays dense interaction among communities in Edirne compared to Ankara. In the 1839-1878 period, only 42% of these petitions were cosigned by both Muslims and non-Muslims in Ankara. In the province of Edirne, 95% of them were signed by both Muslim and non-Muslim residents. In contrast to Ankara where separate petitioning to the state displayed low density of intercommunal relations, residents of Edirne displayed high density of intercommunal ties (Köksal, 2002a, p. 115).

The administrative reforms were quite successful in the province. In 1868, the construction of a municipal building, a hospital, and an orphanage was financed by local residents as a public campaign with a small amount of state funding (Prime Ministry Archives, 1869a). Local residents voluntarily contributed money and labor to this project. Some members of the local elite even offered monetary guarantees to divert state investments for development projects to the region. Building of a transportation and communication network was crucial for the development of trade, and the local elite invested money in the construction business.

The province had a well-maintained transportation and communication system in the late 19th century, which included railroads, roads, bridges, and telegraph lines. These were built and repaired by a combination of state funding and local initiatives. In addition, the state expanded its control by increasing taxation, constructing new state buildings, reorganizing the police organization, and increasing communication with the province. Economic development, integrationist state policy, dense connections among local actors, and cooperation within the local elite contributed to the state of centralization in Edirne.

**Conclusion**

The positive relationship and mutual enforcement of administrative centralization, citizenship, and national identity formation was not present in the provinces of Edirne and Ankara. In the province of Ankara, both administrative centralization and national identity formation proceeded slowly and the Ottoman state was not very successful in both aspects. Local residents were unable and unwilling to cooperate with each other to support socioeconomic development projects. In the absence of local support, state reforms brought limited improvement in the construction of state
infrastructures and administrative centralization. In contrast, administrative structure was quite successfully centralized in the province of Edirne. This administrative centralization, however, did not contribute to the development of a state-imposed national identity. State reforms reinforced religious and ethnic identities instead of forming an Ottoman national identity when improvements in administrative infrastructure and development projects presented more opportunities for tighter organization of millets. Regardless of this politicization of religious and ethnic differences, local residents actively supported and voluntarily contributed to socioeconomic development projects.

The Ottoman centralization as represented in the cases of Edirne and Ankara differs significantly from Centeno’s definition of the European model, which suggests mutual reinforcement of centralization, citizenship, and national identity. The Ottoman case supported the exceptionality of the European state transformation by questioning the positive relationship between centralization and national identity. In Edirne, the community networks that facilitated and supported administrative centralization challenged the ideological component of reforms that is the Ottoman citizenship and national identity.

What is interesting in the province of Edirne was the simultaneous encouragement of state building and peripheral nationalisms by the same local structure. Dense relations between and within millet communities provided opportunities for both contention and cooperation. Existence of ties that bridged religious and ethnic boundaries created a sense of a common good for the inhabitants and facilitated coalition building. The local elite was able to form broad coalitions and to contribute to state development projects and administrative centralization in Edirne. At the same time, dense connections within the millets led to the investment of their members in the development of community structures in the areas of education and justice.

Hechter’s (2000) and Tilly’s (1994) assessment that direct rule and centralization increase both state-building and peripheral (state-seeking) nationalism has some truth in the Ottoman case. Well-organized communities formed the base for peripheral nationalism and challenged the Ottoman citizenship idea in the long run. However, Hechter’s assumption that posits state-seeking nationalism as a reaction against state centralization did not hold completely true in Edirne. Although the residents of Edirne supported centralizing reforms for their economic benefits and community interests, they reacted to the ideological aspect of the reforms by emphasizing their separate religious and ethnic identities from the Ottoman state.

The central lesson to be drawn from the Ottoman experience in the province of Edirne is that the outcome of state centralization is contingent on local responses at the juncture of local and national identities. State reforms should be conceptualized not as top-down applications but as negotiated projects between the state and local groups (Migdal, Kohli, & Shue, 1994). This article has pointed out that ideological and administrative centralizations do not flow the same direction necessarily. It has done so by focusing on the way local ethnic, economic, and religious groups and net-
works hinder or facilitate specific types of state reforms, especially those related to the creation of identities in the Mediterranean region under study in this special issue.

The next step in this study is to define how external factors such as European pressure and level of economic development interacted with local networks to create constraints and opportunities for ideological and administrative centralization in both provinces. The impacts of major events were already visible in the network analysis such as the declining density of the Edirne network as a result of wars and migration flow during the 1868-1878 period.

Another important next step is to expand this comparison to other Ottoman provinces to discuss if the patterns of community networks and their influence on the relationship between centralization and nationalism are generalizable to other regions of the empire. So far, analysis for Northern Bulgaria has shown that the network pattern in Edirne (i.e., coalition building among upper-class ruling elite of different religious and ethnic origins) seems to be a pattern in the core Balkan provinces of the empire. The reforms in Northern Bulgaria were inspected by a commission composed of the highest ranking bureaucrats under the leadership of the Grand Vizier Kübrüslı Mehmed Emin Pasha in 1860. The study of the reports of this commission has shown that the local elites of different religious and ethnic origins, including both notables and provincial officials, cooperated with each other when economic benefits were at stake. This cooperation had both positive and negative connotations. Although in some cases patronage ties among the local elite and local officials led to the formation of mafia like organizations to share state revenues and bribes, in other cases, cooperation of local actors supported implementation of state-development projects such as construction of public buildings and transportation networks. The frequency of local complaints about Greek clergy and petitions for the formation of a separate Bulgarian church in the commission reports indicates increasing national awakening among Bulgarians. Similar to Edirne, administrative centralization possibly did not contribute to the formation of Ottoman national identity in Northern Bulgaria.

Notes
1. States might create concepts, ideas, practices, and identities, but they were not considered dependent on these elements of culture (Steinmetz, 1999, pp. 1-50).
2. There are exceptions. Tetsuya Sahara (1998) argues that Ottoman provincial reforms were quite successful in creating durable representative institutions such as local councils in Bulgaria.
3. Mithad Pasha attempted to form a mixed primary school but was objected by both Muslim and non-Muslim parents in Bulgaria (Safraştan, 1989).
4. According to the Yearbook of the province of Ankara (Prime Ministry Archives, 1881), the total population in the province was 701,009 (642,785 Muslims and 58,224 non-Muslim) in 1880. This number was 1,139,632 (1,003,927 Muslims and 135,705 non-Muslims) in 1907 Yearbook of the province (Prime Ministry Archives, 1907).
5. The main catalogues searched for this analysis are Ayniyat Defter registers, İrades, and Amedi Mektubi Kalemi registers available in Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul.
6. For the use of this methodology, see Tilly and Wood (2003).
7. Personal communication with Charles Tilly clarified the use of density and centrality measures.
8. The finding for the fourth time period (1868-1878) in Edirne seems rather exceptional to the general pattern, but it fits to the historical developments in the region. This time period was marked with contentious politics and rising nationalist claims of Bulgarians, especially after the recognition of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1870). The flight of immigrants to the province during the Crimean War (1853-6) and the occupation of the province during the Ottoman Russian war (1876-1878) decreased the density of the network in the last time period because both local economic activity and connections with immigrants were less than previous time periods.
9. As an indication of the centrality of the Cabbarzade family, blockmodeling analysis for the Ankara network displays the placement of the Cabbarzade family in the most central block of the network (Köksal, 2002b, pp. 189-192). Blockmodeling means partitioning a graph with many nodes into a manageable number of classes (blocks) of structurally similar nodes. Blockmodel reduces the complexity of the whole network to a “simplified graph that nonetheless captures something about the structure of original network.” On blockmodeling, see Gould (2003, p. 247).
10. Their names were Cabbarzade Latif Mustafa, Cabbarzade Sadeddin, and Cabbarzade Mehmed Ali (Prime Ministry Archives, 1855).
11. For example, Zennecizades in the city of Kayseri were middle-range intermediaries (Özkaya, 1994, pp. 131-136).
12. The 1831 Census recorded 145,898 (42.6%) Muslims and 196,520 (57.4%) non-Muslims in the province of Edirne (Panzac, 1996). This figure was 57,921 (31.9%) for Muslims and 122,412 (67.6%) for non-Muslims in the 1870-1871 Census (Prime Ministry Archives, 1870).
13. In the late 1870s, 44 new millet schools providing Western-style education were built mainly with local contributions. See Balta (1999, pp. 209-245) and also Balkanlı (1986).
14. For an example of interethnic conflict, see Prime Ministry Archives, 1859.
15. The original text of the commission reports is located in Atatürk Kitaplığı (1860).
16. Original collective petitions that have seals and signatures of cosigners are available in the İrade and Sadaret Mektubi Kalenli Belgeleri catalogues in the Prime Ministry Archives.
17. This use of public good as a result of dense communal networks cross-cutting different segments of society is similar to Robert Putnam’s (1992) definition of social capital. He argues that dense horizontal relations facilitate democracy and local administration, although he does not question how collective associations can be sources of political mobilization against the state.
18. For the the translation and analysis of commission reports, see Köksal (2007). Additional information about the inspections of the commission in Northern Bulgaria and general observations about reforms in some parts of the province of Edirne can be found in National Archives, Foreign Office (1860a, pp. 75-85; 1860b, pp. 18-21, 24-25; 1862).

References


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